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Fig. 1. The VATLD user interface: (a) Summary and navigation of key performance statistics; (b) Visual landscapes of traffic lights
(upper) and performance scores (lower) over the first two PCA components of semantic dimensions; (c) A live view to detect a traffic
light from either real data or adversarial; (d) Ranked latent dimensions with information of semantics, performance and gradients.
Abstract—Traffic light detection is crucial for environment perception and decision-making in autonomous driving. State-of-the-art
detectors are built upon deep Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) and have exhibited promising performance. However, one
looming concern with CNN based detectors is how to thoroughly evaluate the performance of accuracy and robustness before they
can be deployed to autonomous vehicles. In this work, we propose a visual analytics system, VATLD, equipped with a disentangled
representation learning and semantic adversarial learning, to assess, understand, and improve the accuracy and robustness of traffic
light detectors in autonomous driving applications. The disentangled representation learning extracts data semantics to augment
human cognition with human-friendly visual summarization, and the semantic adversarial learning efficiently exposes interpretable
robustness risks and enables minimal human interaction for actionable insights. We also demonstrate the effectiveness of various
performance improvement strategies derived from actionable insights with our visual analytics system, VATLD, and illustrate some
practical implications for safety-critical applications in autonomous driving.
Index Terms—Traffic light detection, representation learning, semantic adversarial learning, model diagnosing, autonomous driving
1 INTRODUCTION
Traffic light detection is an essential component in autonomous driving.
It helps autonomous cars perceive driving environments by locating
relevant traffic lights and also supports cars to make right decisions
by recognizing the status of lights. The state-of-the-art traffic light
detectors largely rely on deep Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs)
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that have exhibited superior performance in many computer vision tasks
such as image classification, object detection, semantic segmentation
and so on. These detectors are usually trained upon general purpose
object detectors (such as SSD [29], YOLO [34] and Faster R-CNN [35]
locating and recognizing animals, person, vehicles, etc [26]) and then
fine tuned with domain-specific data (driving scenes with traffic lights)
[3] or combined with other prior knowledge about driving scenes, such
as object distribution in a scene [32].
Despite the promising results of CNN based detectors, one concern
is how to thoroughly assess, understand and further improve detector
performance before they can be deployed to autonomous vehicles.
The concern is two-fold: a) accuracy evaluation and improvement
over massive acquired data (training and testing data); b) robustness
evaluation and improvement over unseen data (potential vulnerability).
Firstly, it is a non-trivial task to assess model accuracy and un-
derstand when and why detectors tend to fail. The current evalua-
tion and benchmark methods of model accuracy heavily rely on ag-
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gregated and over-simplified metrics, such as mAP (mean Average
Precision) [26], and fail to provide interpretable and contextual in-
formation to understand model performance. Furthermore, although
rising attention has been paid to the explainability of general CNNs
[2, 6, 11, 27, 28, 36, 42, 43] , the method of unveiling how CNN based
detectors perform still lack of investigation. During a model build-
ing phase, interactive tools are desirable to support model assessing,
understanding and improvement instead of a single accuracy number.
Another burning need is to identify a detector’s potential vulnerabil-
ity, and then assess and improve the robustness over potential vulnerable
cases. Recently, the advance of adversarial attack and robustness re-
search bears much potential to reveal the vulnerability in DNN (Deep
Neural Networks) [13,16,24,40]. Adversarial machine learning fools a
classifier with small perturbation of inputs with the gradient information
obtained from DNNs.
However, two challenges are on the horizon by applying current
adversarial attack methods to understand, evaluate, and improve the
robustness of detectors. First, most adversarial attack methods do not
generate examples with meaningful changes. These methods aim to
fool target models by adding imperceivable noises [13, 16, 24, 40], and
therefore these noises do not provide physical meanings or semantics
for human to understand model robustness, and also provide little guid-
ance to improve robustness in the physical world. Also, the mechanism
understanding adversarial landscape and improving robustness of a
model is desirable. For example, with current methods, we do not know
what the common patterns of learned adversarial examples are, why
they exist, and how to improve.
All told, to asses, understand and improve the performance of traffic
light detectors, we need to overcome two hurdles of dissecting model
accuracy over existing data, and also assessing and improving model
robustness over unseen cases.
Aiming at above challenges, we propose a visual analytics system,
VATLD, to assess, understand, and improve the accuracy and robustness
of traffic light detectors in autonomous driving applications. Specifi-
cally, in this work, our contributions include:
• offering a novel visual analytics method to asses, understand and
improve a detector’s performance of both accuracy and robust-
ness, guided by a semantic representation learning and a minimal
human-in-the-loop approach.
• adapting a representation learning method to efficiently summa-
rize, navigate and diagnose the performance of detectors over
large amounts of data. This method extracts low-dimensional
representation (i.e. latent space) with disentangled intrinsic at-
tributes (such as color, darkness, background etc.) of traffic lights
and serves a fundamental representation for both human-friendly
visualization and semantic adversarial learning.
• proposing a new semantic adversarial learning algorithm to effi-
ciently reveal the robustness issues of detectors without knowing
detector parameters. The adversarial learning efficiently gen-
erates unseen test cases by searching the learned latent space,
and the adversarial results are also interpretable with meaningful
perturbation in the latent space.
• demonstrating the effectiveness of model improvement strategies
guided by visual analytics for real world problems, and illustrating
a promising way of injecting human intelligence into models with
few human interactions.
In sum, we present, VATLD, as the first research effort using a visual an-
alytics approach to alleviate some trustworthy AI issues in autonomous
driving applications. We hope this work can raise some discussion and
open research opportunities for applying visual analytics and human-
in-the-loop approaches to the domain of autonomous driving.
2 RELATED WORK
2.1 Object Detection and Traffic Light Detection
Object detection is a fundamental computer vision task to locate and
recognize the instances of visual objects from a certain class (such as
humans, animals, vehicles, or others) in images. Riding the recent wave
of deep learning, generic object detectors with state-of-the-art perfor-
mance are mostly built upon powerful convolutional neural networks
(CNN). CNN based detectors could be roughly categorized into two
groups: two-stage and one-stage detectors. Two-stage detectors, such
as R-CNN (“Region-based CNN”) based detectors [14, 15, 35], first
propose a set of regions of interests (bounding boxes) by a searching
method or a regional proposal network, and then use a classifier to rec-
ognize these regions. By contrast, one-stage detectors directly search
and classify possible locations over one feature map (e.g. YOLO [34])
or multi-scale feature maps (e.g. SSD [29], RetinaNet [25]). Although
these generic object detectors have achieved promising performance
over multiple data-sets (e.g. coco dataset [26]), specialized detectors are
desired for various perception tasks in autonomous driving applications,
such as detection for traffic lights, lanes, and pedestrians.
Traffic light detector is a specialized detector locating traffic lights
and recognizing their status (such as red, green and yellow). These
detectors are usually built upon CNN based detectors and fine tuned
with domain-specific data (driving scenes with traffic lights) [3], or
combined prior knowledge about driving scenes, such as object distri-
bution [32], and map information [21].
2.2 Assessing and Interpreting CNN based Detectors
A plethora of work has been proposed to assess and interpret generic
CNN models in both machine learning and visual analytics commu-
nities. These works include model-specific and model-agnostic ap-
proaches. Model-specific methods attempt to reveal multiple levels
of details learned in CNNs, such as neuron activation and filters [27],
feature maps [40], concepts and feature attributions [2], while model-
agnostic approaches employ intrinsic explainable models, such as deci-
sion trees, decision rules [31], linear models [36, 42], to mimic the pre-
diction behaviors of CNNs. Surveys from both machine learning [38]
and visual analytics [11, 28, 46] offer more insights into this.
However, assessing and improving the performance of CNN based
detectors, especially for traffic lights, is of scarce. Hoiem et al. [18]
conduct error analysis for generic object detectors by examining the
influences of object characteristics (e.g. occlusion, size, aspect ra-
tio, viewpoint etc.) on detection performance. However, these object
characteristics are handcrafted and hard to scale. Vondrick et al. [41]
present a method to visualize detector features as natural images, but
focusing on traditional histogram of oriented gradients (HOG) based
not CNN-based detectors. In short, these approaches lack of an intrinsic
representation of objects to augment human’s cognition for understand-
ing and diagnosing model performance. Moreover, current methods are
incapable of revealing and assessing the potential weakness of detectors
to ensure the level of confidence that autonomous driving requires.
2.3 Adversarial Robustness
To tackle down the issue of potential weakness for CNN based detectors,
recent developments in adversarial robustness research pointed some
promising directions. The seminal work on adversarial attack [40]
offers us an efficient way to fail a classifier with minimal perturbation
of inputs by following the ascending gradient direction of a model.
According to the way of obtaining gradient information, adversarial
learning methods can be grouped into white-box attacks [16, 40], using
model parameters to calculate gradients, and black-box attacks [13,24],
with limited model queries to estimate gradients. In both approaches,
model robustness can be measured by the minimal perturbation of the
image pixels needed to fail the model.
However, most adversarial attack methods do not generate examples
with semantic meanings and limit their capability to generate actionable
guidance for the model improvement over potential risks in the real
world. Some initial research [10, 23] is conducted on the attacks in
the physical world but it is hard to scale because of the scarce of avail-
able data with physical perturbation. Also, we lack of approaches for
understanding and interpreting the semantics of adversarial examples.
For example, it is not clear what the common patterns of the learned
adversarial examples are and if these patterns are explainable or helpful
to generate actionable insights in practice.
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Fig. 2. A Single Shot multibox Detector (SSD) [29] for traffic lights.
In summary, to assess, understand and improve the performance of
traffic light detectors, we aim to bridge the research gaps of dissecting
the model accuracy over existing data, and also assessing and improving
model robustness over unseen vulnerable cases in this work.
3 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
3.1 How a deep CNN based detector works
In this work, we use a Single Shot multiBox Detector (SSD) [29]
as an example because of its fast detection and high accuracy. With
an image of driving scene as input, a SSD has two tasks: locating
possible objects (traffic lights in this case) with a set of bounding boxes
({bi} : (∆cx,∆cy,w,h), ∆cx,∆cy as the offsets to center coordinates, and
w,h as box width and height), and recognizing object categories (red,
green, yellow, off, and non-object/background) with confidence scores
({ci}, i as a category) for each predicted box, as shown in Fig. 2.
A SSD first passes an image thorough a back-bone CNN, such as
ResNet [17] and MobileNet [20], to extract base features (e.g. 38×38
with 512 channels in Fig. 2). These features are then converted into
smaller size feature maps at different scales. For each cell on a feature
map (e.g., a 3× 3 with depth 256 has 3× 3 = 9 cells), it makes k
predictions of boxes with various aspect ratios, and p class scores for
each box with a fixed 3×3 convolutional predictors. This prediction
is applied to all feature maps at multiple scales to detect objects with
different sizes. Finally, predictions with overlapping boxes are filtered
by a non-maximum suppression method, and the outputs are ranked by
maximal confidence scores of non-background classes.
To simplify the discussion in the paper, let’s consider detector recog-
nition to be a binary classification of traffic-light and non-traffic light
(background), c(x) = ctra f f iclight . However, this is not a general limita-
tion as the proposed method is model-agnostic and can thus be applied
to any object detection network with multiple classes.
3.2 Metrics for Detector Accuracy
Average Precision (AP) is a well-adopted metric to evaluate detector
accuracy by considering both localization and classification tasks [26].
This metric is built up three metrics of IoU, precision and recall.
IoU (Intersection over Union) measures the overlapping between
a ground truth box (GT, green) and a detection box (DT, red), as
shown in Fig. 3-b. By setting a threshold of IoU (usually 0.5), we
can decide if a detection is a True Positive (T P with IoU ≥ 0.5, i.e.,
correct detection) or a False Positive (FP with IoU < 0.5, i.e., wrong
detection), (Fig. 3-c). If a ground truth does not have any detection,
this is a False Negative (FN, i.e., missed detection). In detection
application, True Negatives, namely no detection for background, are
usually irrelevant for evaluation. Fig. 3-a shows an example. The given
image has three ground truth boxes (GTi) and a detector yields four
detections (DTj) with confidence scores larger than 0.5. With a IoU
threshold of 0.5, we can know DT1 and DT2 are T Ps, and DT3 and DT4
are FPs. GT3 has never been detected, namely FN.
Then, we can compute precision and recall: precision = T P/(T P+
FP), recall = T P/(T P+FN). Finally, Average Precision (AP) is de-
fined by the area under the precision-recall curve. For an IoU threshold
of 0.5, it is written as AP@50. If averaging all AP values over different
IoU thresholds or categories, we can obtain a mAP (mean AP). However,
in practice, it is by far not enough to have a single aggregated metric,
such as AP and mAP, to assess, understand and improve a detector.
GT1
DT2
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DT3
DT1
GT2 GT3
IOU = TP
FP
FN
TN
BG
BG
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Fig. 3. An example of detector accuracy calculation. (a) A example with
green boxes as ground truth (GT ), and red boxes as detections (DT ); (b)
IoU calculation and (c) the confusion matrix with a IoU threshold;
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3.3 Design Requirements
We have outlined two challenges on both accuracy and robustness to
assess, understand and improve traffic light detectors. Targeting the
two challenges, we distill two categories of design requirements for
our visual analytic approach from the aspects of data and performance
during several design iterations (see Table 1).
On the data side, for both existing data and unseen data, we need:
• human-friendly data representation and summarization (
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).
This issue arises from the nature of high dimensionality and
sheer volume of images. We need a representation to capture the
intrinsic attributes of images in a lower dimension space and then
summarize them in a human-friendly way [27, 28].
• efficient generation of unseen test cases (
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). We seek for a
method generating edge cases to probe model robustness. These
test cases should be different from the imperceivable noises that
learned from traditional adversarial approaches, and have seman-
tic meanings to guide human to improve the robustness [10, 23].
For the performance of both accuracy and robustness, we require:
• a contextualized understanding for model performance (
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). In-
stead of using an aggregated metric to evaluate models [18], we
would like to put a single score into the contexts of various sizes,
IoU thresholds and confident score ranges.
• performance interpretation for both accuracy and robustness
(
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). It is challenging to understand how the accuracy and ro-
bustness of detectors are impacted by different semantic charac-
teristics of data [11, 28, 38], including colors of traffic lights (red,
green, yellow, off), illumination settings (sun glare or darkness
in the tree), distances (large or small size object in the scene), or
confusing background (similar but irrelevant objects).
• injecting human intelligence for performance improvement with
minimal human interaction (
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). The ultimate goal of model
evaluation and interpretation is to improve its performance with
human knowledge in the loop [12]. Meanwhile, as we are working
with domain experts, we found they have limited bandwidth to
conduct in-depth exploration, but focus on key insights with few
interactions [8]. This calls for maximazing insight generation and
injection with minimal interaction.
The two aspects are inherently related: accuracy understanding
relies on existing data (training/validation/testing data), and robustness
evaluation counts on unseen data. In this work, we strive for a unified
visual analytic approach to alleviate these issues.
4 THE FRAMEWORK OF VATLD
4.1 Framework Overview
We propose a framework, shown in Fig. 4, to support domain experts as-
sess, understand nd improve the performance of traffic light detectors.
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Fig. 4. The VATLD framework. (a). Traffic light objects are first extracted from acquired data including both “in distribution” training data (a1)
and testing data with possible “shifted distribution” (a2), and also unseen cases, “out of distribution” (a3), need to be generated and tested. (b).
Disentangled representation learning extracts interpretable attributes (e.g. colors, brightness, and background) from training objects (b1); and
semantic adversarial learning probes the prediction behaviors (i.e. gradients) of a black-box like detector, and generates meaningful adversarial
unseen examples (b2). Both acquired data (b3) and unseen data (b4) are passed to the detector for detection results. (c). The results along with
meta-data (object size, disentangled representation, gradients etc) are transformed into interactive visualization with multi-faceted performance
analysis and adversarial summarization and interpretation; (d) With minimal human interaction, actionable insights are derived to “lift distribution
up” via data augmentation and inject human intelligence to improve accuracy and robustness.
The framework consists of four modules, including a data process-
ing, b data representation and adversarial learning, c interactive
visualization, and d VA (visual analytics)-assisted improvements.
The framework starts with acquired data, including training and
testing data. Suppose training data is large enough to cover most
cases of traffic lights a detector may encounter, such as different colors
(red, green, yellow), brightness, and symbols (circle or arrows). Let’s
consider these cases as “in-distribution”, as shown in Fig. 4- a1 (Here,
we only focus on the objects of traffic lights, not the whole scene
images, because most detectors, as well as SSD, only look for local
features to locate and recognize objects). However, in testing data, there
may be some traffic lights with “shifted distribution” causing false or
missing detection, such as brightness variations, shown in Fig. 4- a2 . In
this work, we need to identify and understand these distribution shifts
to diagnose detectors.
Meanwhile, there are still some unseen cases coming “out of distri-
bution” (Fig. 4- a3 ) that may fail a detector, and we need to generate and
test them efficiently. These unseen cases may be associated with various
factors, such as lighting, camera condition, and weather changes.
In the second module, two core learning components, disentangled
representation learning and semantic adversarial learning, are in-
troduced to augment our analysis and meet the requirements of
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. Disentangled representation learning extracts i trinsic and inter-
pretable attributes of traffic lights, such as colors, brightness, and back-
ground (Fig. 4- b1 ). This component first provides a human-friendly
data presentation, and also offers a data space where an adversarial
generation can efficiently search. Semantic adversarial learning learns
prediction behaviors of a detector, and generates meaningful adversarial
examples (Fig. 4- b2 ) on top of disentangled representation learning.
After this, both acquired data (Fig. 4- b3 ) and unseen data (Fig. 4- b4 )
are passed to the detector to obtain detection results.
The third module transforms detection results, as well as the meta-
data (object size, disentangled representation, gradients etc), into inter-
active and human-friendly visualizations (Fig. 4 -3a), including multi-
faceted performance analysis and adversarial summarization and
interpretation. The visualizations are designed to address perfor-
mance analysis and interpretation requirements (
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) for both
accuracy over acquired data and robustness over unseen data.
Finally, with minimal human interaction from visual interface, ac-
tionable insights are derived to ge erate more data that attempt to “lift
distribution up” via data augmentation (Fig. 4- d ). This also enables
us inject human intellig nce to improve model accuracy and robustness,
aiming at the requirement
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4.2 Disentangled Representation Learning (DRL)
Disentangled Representation Learning (DRL) is introduced to extract
semantic latent representation of traffic lights (e.g. colors, background,
…
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Fig. 5. (a) Disentangled representation learning; (b) Semantic adversarial
learning.
rotation, etc.), shown in Fig.5-a and generate more data with con-
trollable semantics for data augmentation. The semantic latent rep-
resentation also serves as a cornerstone for both human-friendly data
summarization (
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We adapted a state-of-the-art β -VAE [7] with customized regulariza-
tion of losses. Given an object image (oi ∈ ON , a traffic light with size
N×N), β -VAE includes two components: an encoder, eφ , mapping
an input (oi) into a latent vector (zi ∈ ZD, D: latent dimension size),
namely eφ : oi 7→ zi , and a decoder (dθ ) converting a latent vector (zi)
into a reconstructed image (o˜i), namely dθ : zi 7→ o˜i.
In the vanilla β -VAE, it uses two losses to optimize th model
including reconstruction loss (usually, a mean square error: MSE =
‖oi− o˜i‖2) and latent loss (KL divergence: DKL = DKL((z|x)‖(z))).
Here, we introduce two more regularization terms of prediction loss
and perceptual loss [19] to generate realistic images. We first train a
CNN based classifier to predict traffic light colors. Then, we employ
the pre-trained CNN classifier to predic the color (y˜i) of a reconstructed
image o˜i, and also extract the feature maps from ConvNet layers (φ l(x)
from the lth ConvNet layer) of both original (oi) and re onstructed
images (o˜i). Finally, we can obtain prediction loss ( ross-Entropy loss:
CE(yi, y˜i)) and perceptual loss [19] of feature maps between original
and r constructed images (ΣL‖φ l(oi)−φ l(o˜i)‖2).
The final loss term is the sum of all losses introduced above: L =
MSE(oi, o˜i) + γ|DKL − C| + µCE(yi, y˜i) + νΣL‖φ l(oi)−φ l(o˜i)‖2,
where γ,C are parameters to control disentanglement, and µ,ν are
weights to control reconstruction quality.
4.3 Semantic Adversar al Learning
Built upon DRL, w propose a novel semantic adversarial learning
(SemAdv) ethod to generate meaningful adversarial xamples to test
4
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and interpret the robustness of a detector (Fig.5-b). Two unique require-
ments should be met: a). Adversarial examples need to be meaningful
(not imperceivable noise) and can guide us improve model robustness;
b). The method should be applied to any detector without accessing
model parameters, namely a model-agnostic approach.
The idea is that, given a traffic light object (oi) from a driving
scene (x j) and a black-box detector ( f ), SemAdv needs to generate an
adversarial object image, o′i, to fool the detector, namely, f (o′i→x j)<
0.5. Here, f (o′i→x j) is the detection score of traffic light o′i re-inserted
in the original scene x j . For detection results, P, with bounding boxes,
{b}p, and confidence scores, {c}p, the f (o′i→x j) is defined as:
f (o′i→x j) =
{
max{cd} if IoU(bi,bd)≥ 0.5,∀d ∈ P
0 if IoU(bi,bd)< 0.5,∀d ∈ P
(1)
The core step is to searching the object’s latent space, ZD, to find a
z′i = zi+ εi with a minimal change to generate the adversarial o′i. The
algorithm is shown in algorithm 1.
We adapt a Fast Gradient Sign Attack (FGSM) based approach [16]
to obtain the minimal shift ε (Line 8-15 in algorithm 1). (FGSM is
computationally efficient compared to other strong attack methods,
e.g. PGD [30], by considering the high cost of gradient estimation
needed.) The main idea is to obtain the gradient of a detector, ∇, and
then iteratively push the latent vector, zi, to move along the ascending
direction of the gradient, zt+1i = z
t
i−∇, until the reconstructed object
fails the detector in the scene by f (o′i→x j)< 0.5.
To obtain the gradient without knowing detector parameters, we
use a black-box gradient estimation approach by Natural Evolution
Strategies (NES) [24, 45] (Line 2-7 in algorithm 1). Here, the gradient
is approximated by the amount of output changes, ∆ f , caused by input
changes, ∆z, namely, ∇= ∆ f/∆z. Finally, we constraint the change for
each latent dimension smaller than a budget λ , namely εi,d < λ ,∀d ∈
ZD, to make sure a reconstructed image not goes unrealistic.
Algorithm 1: Semantic Adversarial Learning (SemAdv)
Input: an object oi, from a scene x j, a detector f (x), an encoder
eφ , a decoder dθ , learning rate η , perturbation sample size
K, perturbation scale δ , maximal iteration steps T , and
maximal modification budget λ
Output: an adversarial object o′i, and its modification εi
1 if f (oi→x j)< 0.5 then
2 return “Already failed. No need to attack!”
3 Encode object zi = eφ (oi)
// Estimate gradient for zi
4 Sample σ1, ...,σk ∼N (0, I) for K times
5 Get perturbation: zik = zi +δσk,∀k
6 Generate perturbed objects: o˜ik = dθ (zik),∀k
7 Detection scores: fk = f (o˜ik→x j),∀k
8 Normalized scores: fˆk = ( fk−mean( f ))/std( f ),∀k
9 Gradient estimation: ∇= 1Kδ Σ
K
k=1σk fˆk
// Update zi by T steps
10 for t← 0 to T do
11 zt+1i = z
t
i−η∇
12 Constrain by budget: zt+1i = clip(z
t+1
i ,λ )
13 Generate a new object: o˜t+1i = dθ (z
t+1
i )
14 if f (o˜t+1i→ x j)< 0.5 then
// found an adversarial o′i
15 o′i = o˜
t+1
i
16 Compute the change: εi = zt+1i − z0i
17 return o′i, εi
// Failed within T steps and modification budget λ
18 Set the change as the max budget: εi = λ
19 return o′i, εi
Semantic Robustness. With SemAdv method, we can define a se-
mantic robustness score of a detector by measuring how much minimal
Table 2. Data extracted for visual analytics in the framework
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change in the latent space we need to make to fail the detector. For
a specific object, oi, the semantic robustness is the average L1-norm
of normalized minimal change in the latent space: sri =
‖εi/std(Z)‖L1
λD ,
where εi/std(z) means that each dimension of εi is normalized by the
standard deviation of each dimension, ‖∗‖L1 is the L1-norm, λ is the
modification budget and D is the dimension size. The semantic robust-
ness of a detector, sr( f ), is defined as the average semantic robustness
for all objects, O, in a dataset: sr( f ) = ΣOi=1sr(oi)/|O|,∀i ∈ O.
This semantic robustness is different from traditional adversarial
robustness because it is meaningful and interpretable. We can intuitively
know how much effort we need to change on each dimension with visual
semantics, such as color, lightning, background, to fail a detector.
4.4 Data Extraction
We extract three types of data, including top-n detections, ground truth
objects, and semantic adversarial objects, for analysis. We summarize
the structure of data extracted for visual analytics in Table 4.4. For
each type of data, we collect performance information (bounding boxes,
confidence sores, IoUs), data representation (image patches, latent vec-
tors) and other meta-information (size, class, gradient, robustness). For
unseen adversarial data, we only learn adversarials for the correspond-
ing ground truth objects that have been successfully detected, namely
f (oi→x j)> 0.5 (Line 8-15 in algorithm 1).
5 THE USER INTERFACE OF VATLD
Guided by above framework, we design and implement a visual ana-
lytics system, VATLD, Fig. 1, to assess, understand and improve traffic
light detectors. The system user interface consists of four views: a
Multi-faceted Summary, b Performance Landscape-TileScape, c
Driving Scene View, and d Semantic Representation View-hPCP.
5.1 Multi-faceted Summary
This view offers a summary and navigation for key performance statis-
tics ( Fig. 1- a ). The top of Fig. 1- a , summarizes the total number of
traffic light objects in a dataset, the number of top detections per image
(top-5 in this work), false positive (FP), false negative (including both
never detected lights, FN-I, and confusing lights with low confidence
scores, FN-II) and total adversarial. Also, bar charts in Fig. 1- a , show
the distribution of performance metrics (including IoU, confidence
score, and robustness for valid detection) and meta-info (object size).
Furthermore, the metric charts are coordinated with each other to
filter data and support multi-faceted performance analysis for accuracy
and robustness in other views. This is designed to support contextu-
alized understanding of performance,
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. For example, FP, FN-I
and FN-II detections can be selected by setting different filtering condi-
tions: FPs are detections with zero size (no ground truth), IoU larger
than a threshold of 0.5, and confidence score larger than 0.5, namely,
FP = {DTi|si = 0∧ IoUi > 0.5∧ ci > 0.5}. This view also enables a
user to quickly navigate to FP or FN visual summary by clicking the
icons in the dashboard to apply pre-defined filtering conditions.
5.2 Performance Landscape View: TileScape
We design a view of performance landscape, TileScape, to summarize
visual characteristics and corresponding performance over tens of thou-
sands of objects (design requirement
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), shown in the panel b of
Fig. 1. In TileScape, each cell (tile) is an aggregated bin of many detec-
tions which are similar in the semantic latent space learned from DRL
(Fig. 6- a ). Each data-point is a detection, located in the latent space
by its latent vector encoded from a detected image patch. Then, the
data-points are aggregated into bins, called as tiles, according to a view
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Fig. 6. The design TileScape and hPCP: a) Tile aggregation; b) Dimen-
sion visual encodings; c) Hierarchical PCP; d) Rank-To-Interpret.
range and bin size. Also, one object is selected as the representative
one for each tile. Here, we use the object with median score from a bin.
Additionally, in the background of TileScape, a contour density map
shows the data distribution in the current space.
Each tile visually encodes one of four categories of object informa-
tion: visual appearance (image patch), confidence score, robustness
score and adversarial gradient direction. As shown in the upper part of
Fig. 1- b , each tile shows a detected image patch: either a ground truth
(GT) object image when a detection (DT) is matched, or the image
patch cropped from a driving scene by a DT bounding box when no
matched GT object is found for the current DT. The tile can also en-
code detection accuracy and robustness scores with colored rectangles,
shown in the lower part of Fig. 1- b . Users can change visual encoding
for tiles via a drop-down menu in the panel.
Along the two axes of TileScape, we also design an aggregated image
bars to show the data distribution along each axis, Fig. 6- b . The data
is also binned and aggregated with the same approach described above
for each axis. Each bar consists of a representative image, a rectangle
and an arrow glyph with similar visual encoding: bar height indicates
the number of data-points, bar color encodes the median score of either
confidence or robustness, and an arrow shows gradient direction.
Users can zoom and pan TileScape, to observe the patterns at differ-
ent levels of aggregation. Also, users can interactively select any latent
dimensions or the PCA components of latent dimensions to lay out the
TileScape view. By default, the first two PCAs of latent dimensions are
used to show overall visual and performance patterns.
5.3 Semantic Representation View: hPCP
To efficiently explore the semantic representation space, a hierarchical
parallel coordinates plot, (hPCP), is designed as shown in Fig. 1- d .
First, latent dimensions are hierarchically clustered with an agglom-
erative method to efficiently organize and navigate these dimensions
(Fig. 6- c ). The clusters are formed by a ward linkage [44] that mini-
mizes the variance of Euclidean distance among all latent object vectors
within a cluster. Only top dimensions can be visible by applying a dis-
tance threshold. More dimensions can be shown by expanding subtrees.
The first two PCA components of latent dimensions are also included
to capture the dominate variance of all dimensions. They are organized
as a special subtree in the root node.
An aggregated image bar plot is also used for each dimension to
show the semantics captured by this dimension, shown in Fig. 6- b . We
first bin and aggregate the data over each dimension, and then use the
same visual encoding for data distribution, performance (confidence
and robustness) scores and gradient directions as in TileScape. The
shown image here is a blending of five random underlying images.
Additionally, a gray area plot is introduced as background to compare
data distribution with the forefront bar chart. We can use this to compare
data distribution of testing and training data over each dimension.
A parallel coordinates plot is then applied upon the top dimensions.
By connecting data coordinates across all visible dimensions with
curved lines, it shows dimension correlation and data clusters. To
reduce visual clutter, we do not show the lines of all data-points but
only these of our interest via users’ interaction. For example, hovering
a bin on a dimension will show lines for the dat points in this bin.
Semantic interpretation by coordinating with TileScape. Two
mechanisms are introduced to help users understand dimension seman-
tics and also interpret their impact over performance (
Data Performance
Existing Data Accuracy
Unseen Data Robustness 
Design 
Requirements
      

      
  Contextualized Understanding 
        Performance Interpretation
       Human-in-the-loop Improvement 
Categories Challenges 
Data Existing Data Data Representation Semantic RepresentationUnseen Data Efficient Generation 
Performance
Accuracy Contextualized Understanding Human-in-the-loop 
Improvement Robustness Semantic Interpretation
C1
C2
C1
C1
CD1
RD1
CP1 CP2
RP3
Efficient Generation for 

Semantic Edge Cases 
Human-friendly Data 
Representation/Summarization
RP2
RP1
RD2
Ground Truth - GTi Top-N Detection - DTi Adversarial - Advi
Performance Bounding Box - BBgti,
IoUi
Bounding Box - BBdti,

Conf. Score - Ci
Box same as BBgti 
(only as GTi is detected)
Data 
Representation
Image Patch - Oi,

Latent Vec - Zi
Same as Oi, Zi   if matched,

Odti, Zdti if no match
Image Patch - O’i,

Latent Vec - Z’i
Meta-Info Size - Si Same as Si   if matched,
Size = 0 if no match
Gradient - ∇i,

Robustness - sri
DTi
Advi
Oi O′ iBdi
RD1
RP3
RP2
RP1
RD2
Class - Ci
).
hPCP→ TileScape. Any dimension from hPCP can be selected as x
or y axis for TileScape to examine what visual semantics are embedded
in this dimension. Also by hovering or brushing the dimension bins in
hPCP, corresponding tiles in TileScape are highlighted to show what
visual feature the selected bins capture.
TileScape → hPCP. Interaction from TileScape to hPCP enables
users to interpret detector’s performance with the semantics learned by
latent dimensions. Users can use a lasso to select a group of bins of
interest (e.g. low confidence scores) in TileScape, and corresponding
lines and bins are highlighted in the latent space of hPCP.
A Rank-To-Interpret method is proposed to rank dimensions by
their importance to separate the selection from other data points (Fig. 6-
d ). The selected and unselected data are first marked with different
labels for a target variable, and their latent vectors are used as features to
estimate their mutual information (MI) towards the target variable [37].
The dimensions are then ranked by their MI values and agglomeratively
organized as a tree structure for hPCP. In this way, we can understand
the top semantic dimensions explaining the selection.
5.4 Driving Scene View
The driving scene view offers a live detection result for a selected object
(Fig. 1- c ). This view shows the ground truth box (green) and detected
bounding box (red) in a driving scene image, and also scores of IOU,
confidence and robustness (Fig. 1- c1 ).
This view also helps users understand adversarial samples and associ-
ated adversarial gradients by inserting different adversarial generations
into its driving scene to examine detection results, shown in the bottom
of Fig. 1- c2 . The original object is in the middle (zero point) of the
horizontal axis, and different samples are generated from this object
by moving ascending (right) or descending (left) along the direction
of adversarial gradient in the latent space. By examining generated
images and their test results, we can see how an adversarial gradient
changes object appearance and detection performance.
6 CASE STUDY AND EVALUATION
We closely worked with four domain experts from a function test-
ing department for autonomous driving applications over one year.
Two of the experts collaboratively contributed this work and the other
two conducted model testing in their daily work. We together went
through several design iterations and system refinements to alleviate
their pain-points, namely how to generate actionable insights to assess,
understand and improve traffic light detectors with minimal human-in-
the-loop. The system has been successfully transferred and deployed
in their testing platform. The following use cases and experimental
evaluations were distilled from their routine practice of model testing.
6.1 The Dataset and Detector
The experts suggested to use a public dataset, Bosch Small Traffic
Lights Dataset [33], to study and benchmark system capability. The
dataset includes 5093 training images (10756 annotated traffic lights)
and 8334 test images (13486 annotated traffic lights). The baseline
traffic light detector was provided by domain experts for case study pur-
pose. The provided detector is based on SSD MobileNet V1 (see Fig. 2
for model architecture) and achieves state-of-the-art accuracy with
AP@IoU50 = 0.478 (compared with 0.41 published in [4]). We ran
the detector over both training and testing dataset and saved detection
results for analysis.
6.2 Representation and Adversarial Learning
We cropped 10683 valid traffic lights from the training dataset and then
resized them into 64x64 to train the models of disentangled representa-
tion (DRL) and adversarial learning (SeADV). We only used training
dataset for both models and reserved the test dataset for experiments.
For DRL, the network architecture is the same as β -VAE [7] with
latent dimension |Z| = 32, γ = 100,C = 20,µ = 4,ν = 1, learning
rate 5e-5, 2K maximum iterations to increase capacity C, and 5k total
iterations. With the pre-train d RL model, we conducted seman ic
adversarial attack and generation against the base detector over all
train objects. Among 7286 successful detected objects by the base
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Fig. 7. The detection confidence (accuracy) landscape and error diagnosing over test dataset. (a) Detection confidence summary over the first two
PCA components of latent dimensions, and one low confidence area (‘S1’); (b) Object visual summary over PCA components; (c) Ranked latent
dimensions explain how the selection ‘S1’ is different from the rest, and the dimension ‘DIM7’, and ‘DIM13’ capture distribution shift of high brightness
for red lights; (d) One top ranked dimension, ‘DIM28’, indicates low confidence scores over yellow lights; (e) Re-layout confidence summary with
‘DIM28’ as x-axis, and show an outlier cluster of yellow lights with low confidence score, ‘S2’ ; (f) Top two ranked latent dimensions, ‘DIM28’ and
‘DIM7’, explain the visual semantics of yellow lights with low confidence scores.
detector, we obtained 6830 adversarial objects (93.7% success rate)
and failed to attack 456 objects with the modification budget of two
standard deviations over latent vectors, λ = 2 (other hyper-parameters
in SeADV: η = 0.01, K = 512, δ = 0.5, and T = 500).
After model pretraining and data preprocessing, we extracted re-
quired data from both training and testing datasets to drive interactive
visualization. The first two PCA components of both training and test-
ing objects were projected with the same PCA model that was built
upon the latent vectors of training objects. This kept the PCA views of
training and testing data consistent and comparable.
6.3 Visual Analysis Cases
6.3.1 Show me performance landscape
The experts were eager to see the overall accuracy landscape of the
detector. They first examined the confidence landscape over test dataset,
shown in Fig. 7. Intuitively, they had several observations.
First, there was a clear distribution imbalance of detection accuracy
over different object colors, as shown in Fig. 7- a b . The semantics of
color were captured by the first PCA component for latent dimensions,
and shown as the x-axis in Fig. 7- b : right for red and left for green
light (the color variance was learned from the data, and we didn’t
explicitly use color attributes). It was clear that the detector had worse
performance over red lights compared with green ones.
Secondly, data distribution gap and low confidence score areas were
observed. There was a large sparse area in the middle of Fig. 7- b ,
indicating testing data has less coverage in this area (compared with the
background density map built from the training dataset). However, one
interesting finding is that the detector still had low confidence score
in the middle part even though the training data had dense coverage
in this part. Also, another low score area is located on very right side,
S1 in Fig. 7- a . This area are mostly red lights that looked clear and
bright, and it was quite interesting to see why the detector failed here.
Therefore, two following-up questions were asked by the domain
experts: a) What factors lead the low performance areas? b) What
actionable insights we can have to improve the accuracy of our interest?
6.3.2 What confused the detector?
The experts were first interested in why the detector had low confidence
score in the middle area where the training data already had good cov-
erage. They turned to the training data by examining visual summary
of objects (upper part in Fig. 1- b ) and confidence scores (Fig. 8- a ).
They observed that even for the training data, traffic light objects in the
middle bottom part was quite challenging for the detector, as shown
in yellow and red score bins. By looking and exploring the semantics
of top dimensions in Fig. 8- b , they found the middle range of PCA0
explains the ambiguity of traffic lights caused low confidence scores
(as PCA0 mainly captures the variations of colors), and the lower end
PCA0
PCA1
a
b
Fig. 8. The visual summary for training data. (a) Detection confidence
(accuracy) landscape (b) Top latent dimensions with semantics.
of PCA1 shows dark traffic lights are difficult for the detector (as PCA1
mainly explains the variations from dark to bright). Therefore, they
could conclude that the ambiguous and dark traffic lights explained the
low confidence area in the middle part.
To investigate the low confidence area S1 in Fig. 7- a b , they ranked
latent dimensions to show their importance contributing to this selection.
As shown in Fig. 7- c , they observed that the left end of the ‘DIM7’,
and ‘DIM13’ with red color contributed most to the selection S1. They
also noticed that the selection on these two dimensions has very high
brightness, and the distribution of high brightness in testing data (the
colored bars in Fig. 7- c ) is much larger than the distribution in training
data (the gray area plot in Fig. 7- c . This explained the low confidence
scores of S1 resulted from the under-representative high brightness red
lights in the training dataset.
Further, they also observed one dimension, ‘DIM28’ among the
top ranked dimensions, showed low confidence scores over yellow
lights (Fig. 7- d ). After using ‘DIM28’ as x-axis to re-lay out the
score summary, they can see an outlier cluster of yellow lights with
low confidence scores, shown as S2 in Fig. 7- e . They ranked latent
dimensions to explain these yellow lights selected in S2 , and found the
dimensions of ‘DIM28’ and ‘DIM7’ explain the visual semantics of
yellow lights with low confidence scores, as shown in Fig. 7- f .
6.3.3 How about potential failure cases?
The domain experts were curious about how robust the detector was
and where potential failure cases might come from. They examined
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Fig. 9. Diagnosis for data quality and confusing objects. (a) Identifying
mislabeled data (a3) by selecting the predictions without ground truth
(zero size predictions in a1) and having high confidence scores (a2); (b)
Understanding confusing objects (e.g. pedestrian sign and car rear lights
in b3) by selecting the predictions without ground truth (b1) and having
uncertain confidence scores (b2).
the visual summary of robustness scores for all train objects, the lower
part in Fig. 1- b . Overall, the detector had better robustness over
green lights on left compared with the red lights on right in the view.
Robustness was very low in the middle bottom part (selection S0 in
Fig. 1- b ). This part is mostly the dark and ambiguous traffic lights
shown in the visual summary of training objects in Fig. 1- b .
The domain experts then used latent dimensions to understand the
low robustness area S0 . As they selected the low robustness area and
then ranked the dimensions, the top dimensions ‘DIM7’ and ‘DIM4’
capture the most important visual traits of the low robustness area
(Fig. 1- d ). It showed that the selected range of ‘DIM7’ represents
color ambiguity and the one of ‘DIM4’ indicates dark color (Fig. 1- d1 ).
They further examined the adversarial gradient directions of top di-
mensions in the low robustness area. They could see that the adversarial
gradients push the visual appearance of traffic lights to move towards
ambiguous appearance over the dimension ‘DIM7’ (the arrows over
bars pointing into the center in Fig. 1- d ). In the live detection view,
Fig. 1- c , they also tried to put various generated objects along the
gradient direction to test detection results in the scene.
They concluded that the detector was sensitive in the dark and am-
biguous lighting conditions and therefore showed low robustness in
these conditions. By examining the original scenes for low robustness
cases, the lighting conditions were caused by some factors like far-away
distance, shadow by building and tree or occluded by other objects.
6.3.4 Identifying noisy labels, confusing objects and more
The multi-faceted visual analysis enabled the experts to conduct more
useful diagnosis about data quality and detector behaviors. For example,
it helped the experts identify data with missing labels, as shown in
Fig. 9- a3 by selecting FPs with high confidence scores (Fig. 9- a1 a2 ).
It also assisted users understand confusing objects for the detector, such
as pedestrian sign and car rear lights in Fig. 9- b3 , by selecting FPs
with uncertain confidence scores (Fig. 9- b1 b2 ). With various filtering
combination in Fig. 1- a , the experts could conduct more analysis such
as the impact of object size over performance.
6.4 Visual Analytics Assisted Improvements
With the insights from above analysis, domain experts developed three
improvement strategies (Table 3). These strategies aimed at generat-
ing more data from training data based on the VA (Visual Analytics)
insights, and augmenting model training to validate if we can improve
the performance of either accuracy or robustness.
Table 3. Data augmentation strategies assisted by visual analytics
Strategies VA Insights Generation Controlled Dimensions Cases
Distribution 

Guided 
Augmentation

(VA-Dist-Aug)
Under-
representative 
semantics (bright 
red and yellow) in 
training data
Uniformly 
upsampling in 
controlled 
dimensions
Bright 
red
DIM7: [-3, -1.2]

DIM13: [-3, -1.8]
 475
940
Yellow DIM28: [-3, -1.75]
DIM7: [-0.75, 0] 465
Global Adversarial  
Augmentation

(Glb-Adv-Aug)
Adversarials 
expose potential 
weakness 
Globally 
generate 
adversarials
No dimension in control

(use all latent dimensions)
6803

(3401)
VA Guided  

Adversarial 
Augmentation 

(VA-Adv-Aug)
Dark ambiguous 
objects have low 
robustness
Dark ambiguous objects: 

DIM7: [-1, -1]

DIM4: [1, 4]
1242
Diversely 

generate 
adversarials w/ 
selected visual 
attributes
Table 4. Accuracy improvement with distribution guided data augmenta-
tion, measured by AP@IoU50 (5 trials, larger is better).
Training Objects (10683) Adversarials (λ=2)
Failed Detected Succeed Adv Failed Attack Robustness Dark Object Rbst. 
Base 3357 7326 7007 (95.65%) 319 0.72 0.38
AdvAug 3243 7440 6074 (81.64%) 1366 0.96 0.47
VAAug 3224 7459 6032 (80.87%) 1427 0.99 0.49
Detectors
Models All mean (std)
Off mean 
(std)
Green mean 
(std)
Yellow mean 
(std)
Red mean 
(std)
Base 0.368 (N/A) 0.165 (N/A) 0.603 (N/A) 0.178 (N/A) 0.527 (N/A)
Glb-Adv-Aug 0.528 (0.017) 0.300 (0.023) 0.734 (0.011) 0.372 (0.023) 0.705 (0.014)
VA-Adv-Aug 0.564 (0.007) 0.349 (0.009) 0.741 (0.004) 0.440 (0.012) 0.724 (0.009)
Models All mean (std)
Off mean 
(std)
Green mean 
(std)
Yellow mean 
(std)
Red mean 
(std)
Base 0.478 (N/A) N/A 0.752 (N/A) 0.560 (N/A) 0.599 (N/A)
Glb-Adv-Aug 0.504 (0.014) N/A 0.732 (0.005) 0.682 (0.044) 0.600 (0.015)
VA-Adv-Aug 0.518 (0.013) N/A 0.716 (0.023) 0.758 (0.022) 0.599 (0.017)
Adversarial Accuracy AP@.50IOU (5 Trials)
Natural Accuracy AP@.50IOU (5 Trials)
Models All mean (std)
Off mean 
(std)
Green mean 
(std)
Yellow mean 
(std)
Red mean 
(std)
Base 0.478 (N/A) N/A 0.752 (N/A) 0.56 (N/A) 0.599 (N/A)
VA-Dist-Aug 0.493 (0.008) N/A 0.748 (0.013) 0.582 (0.033) 0.643 (0.009)
 Accuracy mAP@.50IOU (5 Trials) 
6.4.1 Distribution Guided Augmentation for Accuracy
This trategy is to generate data from training data with the insight of
shifted data distribution learned in Sect. 6.3.2 to augment the detector’s
accuracy (noted as VA-Dist-Aug in Table 3). The experts already
understood that there were under-representative traffic lights with bright
red and yellow color in training data.
In this strategy, for each case of under-representative bright red or yel-
low color, the selected dimensions (e.g. ‘DIM28’ and ‘DIM7’ for yellow
lights) were used to generate more training data. The training objects in
the selected ranges (e.g. DIM28∈ [−3,−1.75] and DIM7∈ [−0.75,0])
were first retrieved. For each retrieved object, k (k = 5 here) data
points were uniformly sampled within the selected dimension ranges
(e.g. [−3,−2.75, ...,−2] for ‘DIM28’ and [−0.75,−0.6, ...,−0.15] for
‘DIM7’). Then the sampled vectors were used to reconstruct object im-
ages. The generated object images are then blended back into original
scene images as augmented data. 940 new objects were generated and
used to fine tune the base detector along with original training data.
Table 4 shows accuracy improvement with five trials. The overall
accuracy was improved from 0.478 to 0.493, measured by AP@IoU50.
The accuracy improvements over red and yellow lights were significant,
although the green light accuracy had little drop. This indicates that the
distribution guided data augmentation could help overall accuracy.
6.4.2 Adversarial Guided Data Augmentation for Robustness
A common way to improve robustness is adversarial training, namely
training models with adversarial data [16]. With a similar idea, ad-
versarial data were mixed with original training data and then used to
fine tune the base model. To evaluate semantic robustness, the half of
all adversarial objects was randomly selected as adversarial test data,
and thus there was d6803/2e= 3402 adversarial testing objects (along
their original scene images). The second half adversarial objects (3401)
Table 5. Semantic robustness and accuracy improvements with adver-
sarial augmentation, measuredby AP@IoU50 (5 trials, larger is better).
Training Objects (10683) Adversarials (λ=2)
Failed Detected Succeed Adv Failed Attack Robustness Dark Object Rbst. 
Base 3357 7326 7007 (95.65%) 319 0.72 0.38
AdvAug 3243 7440 6074 (81.64%) 1366 0.96 0.47
VAAug 3224 7459 6032 (80.87%) 1427 0.99 0.49
Detectors
Models All mean (std)
Off mean 
(std)
Green mean 
(std)
Yellow mean 
(std)
Red mean 
(std)
Base 0.368 (N/A) 0.165 (N/A) 0.603 (N/A) 0.178 (N/A) 0.527 (N/A)
Glb-Adv-Aug 0.528 (0.017) 0.300 (0.023) 0.734 (0.011) 0.372 (0.023) 0.705 (0.014)
VA-Adv-Aug 0.564 (0.007) 0.349 (0.009) 0.741 (0.004) 0.440 (0.012) 0.724 (0.009)
Models All mean (std)
Off mean 
(std)
Green mean 
(std)
Yellow mean 
(std)
Red mean 
(std)
Base 0.478 (N/A) N/A 0.752 (N/A) 0.560 (N/A) 0.599 (N/A)
Glb-Adv-Aug 0.504 (0.014) N/A 0.732 (0.005) 0.682 (0.044) 0.600 (0.015)
VA-Adv-Aug 0.518 (0.013) N/A 0.716 (0.023) 0.758 (0.022) 0.599 (0.017)
Semantic Adversarial Accuracy AP@.50IOU (5 Trials)
Natural Accuracy AP@.50IOU (5 Trials)
Models All mean (std)
Off mean 
(std)
Green mean 
(std)
Y llow mean 
(std)
Red mean 
(std)
Base 0.478 (N/A) N/A 0.752 (N/A) 0.56 (N/A) 0.599 (N/A)
VA-Dist-Aug 0.493 (0.008) N/A 0.748 (0.013) 0.582 (0.033) 0.643 (0.009)
 Accuracy mAP@.50IOU (5 Trials) 
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were used for training and validation.
Two adversarial guided data augmentation were experimented: Glb-
Adv-Aug and VA-Adv-Aug in Table 3. In the Glb-Adv-Aug strategy,
all 3401 adversarial objects were mixed with original training data for
training and validation. The rationale for this strategy is that adver-
sarials can expose potential weakness of a detector, and training with
adversarials would help a model detect these adversarials.
In the VA-Adv-Aug strategy, more adversarials were generated
to augment model robustness with VA insights that the dark am-
biguous objects had low robustness. As the experts observed that
the dark ambiguous objects were mostly explained by ‘DIM7’ and
‘DIM4’ (Fig. 1- d ), they decided to generate 5 more adversarials
for each object in the selected ranges of the two dimensions (i.e.
DIM7 ∈ [−1,1], DIM4 ∈ [1,4]). Also, they observed the adversarial
gradients over ‘DIM7’ and ‘DIM4’ tends to push towards homoge-
neous dark and ambiguous directions, and thus they needed to diversify
adversarial generation by fixing the gradients of these two dimen-
sions. To further diversify the generation, other random 3 dimensions
were also fixed during the process of adversarial searching, namely
zt+1i j = z
0
i j, j ∈ [d4,d7,drnd1,drnd2,drnd3] in algorithm 1-line 10. In this
way, 1242 adversarial objects were obtained and mixed with global
adversarial objects (3401) for adversarial training and validation.
Table 5 shows the performance improvement results with five trials.
The results include two metrics of AP@IoU50 over adversarial test
dataset for semantic robustness evaluation and the natural test dataset
for accuracy evaluation. Both methods significantly improved seman-
tic robustness with AP@IoU50 of 0.528 and 0.564 compared with
base model of 0.368 over adversarial test data. Meanwhile, the two
methods also improved the accuracy over the natural test data from
0.478 to 0.504 and 0.518. This indicates that adversarial guided data
augmentation can improve both accuracy and robustness performance.
Moreover, the visual analytics guided method boosted both accuracy
and robustness performance even further. With VA insights , the VA-
Adv-Aug enhanced the semantic robustness accuracy from 0.528 to
0.564 and the natural accuracy from 0.504 to 0.518 on top of the Glb-
Adv-Aug. The robustness improvement across different categories (off,
green, yellow and read) were also observed. This validates our assump-
tion that the VA insights can further improve the model performance of
both accuracy and robustness with domain experts’ knowledge.
6.5 Domain Experts Feedback
The system was deployed and used in the workplace of the domain
experts. They also used the system to analyze in-production dataset
and detectors. Here, we only reported the feedback that they had with
above public data because of confidentiality issues.
Overall, domain experts were impressed by the “actionable insights”
obtained and also felt excited about experiment results on model im-
provement by “injecting domain knowledge” with little human-in-the-
loop. For model validation, they found the tools capability to aid them
in targeting weak spots is “specifically useful”, and visual summary was
“the most useful feature” by considering the data magnitude they have.
They were able to be“swiftly aware about” detectors sensitive regions
with “constrained adversarial attacks using the realistic augmenta-
tions”. For robustness interpretation, the tool enabled them understand
network weaknesses with “reasonable meaningful information”, such
as gradient directions and semantic dimensions.
They also suggested improvements from practical perspectives, such
as “tracking quality trends” over different datasets and models, and
“exporting and reporting” actionable insights. Also, they expressed
some visualizations were “overwhelming” to take improvement actions
upon, such as gradient maps. This calls for us to strengthen our design
principles of “minimal human interaction” and augmenting human
cognition with “interpretable representation learning”.
7 DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
7.1 What have we learned?
Practical implications for detector evaluation in autonomous driv-
ing. We learned some practical implications for both model evaluation
and improvement in autonomous driving applications. One challenge
in this domain is to deal with long-tail data distribution: although most
cases could be covered by acquired dataset, rare cases comes from the
long tail part [1]. To efficiently retrieve and collect data for model eval-
uation and improvement, we can search and retrieve data with potential
issues via our approach (e.g. high brightness and dark ambiguous ob-
jects for detectors), from a huge candidate dataset, or we can collect
new driving scenes with such lighting conditions to improve models.
This data-driven visual analytics approach bears much potentials for
model understanding and improvement.
Augmenting human cognition with representation learning. Se-
mantic representation learning shows promising capability of augment-
ing human cognition to understand complicated data and model space
of deep neural networks. Some learning approaches, such as feature
maps [40], concepts and feature attributions [2], directly extract inter-
pretable representations from model spaces. In this work, semantic
representation learning extracts human-friendly representations from
data space, and then reveal feature contribution towards model pre-
dictions. Both approaches serve as more powerful technologies of
understanding, interacting with and improving AI systems [9].
Minimal human-in-the-loop and maximizing actionable in-
sights. We aim at utilizing minimal human interactions [8] to inject
domain knowledge into models during system design. Towards this end,
two learning components of semantic representation and adversarial
generation are introduced to complete heavy-lifting work: semantic rep-
resentation extracting interpretable dimensions for human-friendly visu-
alization and interaction, and adversarial generation reducing searching
space to probe model potential weakness. Meanwhile, we also target
maximizing actionable insights with minimal interaction (e.g. Rank-
To-Interpret feature), but also provide rich interactive visualization to
enable in-depth exploration on demand. However, it is a challenging
task to balance the level of details (e.g. more details for adversarial
searching) to be presented so that users can make sensible and reliable
decisions with few interactions [39]. This calls for more investigation.
7.2 Limitations and future work
Extended to multi-object detection. Our current system aims at traf-
fic light detection problem, namely a single object detector. However,
the framework is also applicable to the problem of multi-object detec-
tions (e.g. person, car, truck, bike, rider, sign, etc). We plan to extend
this wok to generic object detectors for autonomous driving.
Representation learning with powerful expressiveness. In spite
of promising semantic interpretation in disentangled representation
learning [7], we need non-trivial visual design, such as hPCP to asso-
ciate semantics with latent dimensions (e.g. which dimensions explain
object color or brightness). One possible remedy is to investigate repre-
sentation learning methods of combining neural networks and symbolic
learning [5, 22], by associating symbolic schema (e.g. decision tree, or
rules) with latent representations.
Understanding detector beyond objects. The current method
largely uses the visual semantics of objects to understand and improve
object detectors, but leaves the context of driving scenes for future
work. We can extend this approach by parsing driving scene semantics
with additional representation learning components [47].
8 CONCLUSION
In this work, we propose a visual analytic system, VATLD, to assess,
understand, and improve the accuracy and robustness of traffic light
detectors for autonomous driving. This approach is built upon a repre-
sentation learning to augment human cognition with human-friendly
visual summarization, and a semantic adversarial learning to expose in-
terpretable robustness issues with minimal human interactions. We also
demonstrate the effectiveness of performance improvement strategies
derived with VATLD, and illustrate practical implications for real-world
problems in production environments. We hope this work can cap-
ture a silver of ways of applying the approaches of visual analytics
and human-in-the-loop to alleviate some trustworthy AI issues in au-
tonomous driving domain.
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